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THE 1976 MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
JOSEPH PATCHAN* AND SUSAN B. COLLINS**
After generally surveying the history of municipal bankruptcy
legislation in the United States and former chapter IX in particu-
lar, an in depth analysis of the new chapter IX provisions is given.
The article concludes that the new act, while having several im-
perfections, will well serve cities overburdened with debt.
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In 1841 Representative Fessenden, an outstanding Congres-
sional leader of his day, argued for expansion of the federal govern-
ment's powers in a bankruptcy bill then before Congress and visual-
ized the unthinkable possibility
in which a whole community becomes insolvent by some stupen-
dous accident, or by some magnificent but fallacious scheme,
such as other countries have seen and felt at no distant day. Can
it be pretended that a power to apply a remedy to a disorder that
is paralyzing and destroying the body politic exists nowhere?
Such an idea is a libel upon the very name of government.'
The prospect of a city in bankruptcy, almost inconceivable to Con-
gress in 1841, is a real prospect today. Bankruptcy became a reality
for a number of small cities during and after the depression of the
1930's. Now it is clear that large cities are not immune from finan-
cial default and bankruptcy.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Bankruptcy legislation permitting discharge of debt is exclu-
sively a federal power given to Congress by the framers of the Con-
stitution.2 Only since 1934 has there been federal legislation directed
* Partner, Baker, Hostetler & Patterson, Cleveland, Ohio. Member Ohio Bar. Consult-
ant, Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C. Formerly Bankruptcy Judge, Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio.
** Associate, Baker, Hostetler & Patterson, Cleveland, Ohio. Member, Ohio and District
of Columbia Bars. Formerly attorney with Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, D.C.
1. C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 159 (1935).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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to the adjustment of public debt. The legislation was born of prob-
lems arising from a wave of small town defaults in the early 1930's
and resulted from tax collection and foreclosure difficulties precipi-
tated by the depression era. It was apparent there was need to
extend the uniform benefits of the Bankruptcy Act to political sub-
divisions of the states. Where total creditor accord to a deferred
payment plan could not be obtained by the debtor, bankruptcy law
could control the dissenting minority.3
Prior to 1934, municipalities were expressly excluded from the
scope of federal bankruptcy laws.4 Congress, pressed by the need of
the times, reversed its statutory posture and supplied "Provisions
for the Emergency and Temporary Aid of Public Debtors."5 Before
this federal legislation, municipalities and taxing units in financial
trouble resorted to debt moratoria and creditor stay laws when
available by state law.' Alternatively, they sought consent agree-
ments from each of their creditors and, where necessary, each of
their bondholders. However, creditors and bondholders were under
no compulsion to accept any proposal.
The 1934 municipal bankruptcy statute lasted until tested 2
years later in the Supreme Court. It was found unconstitutional as
an invasion of the sovereignty of the states. The Court considered
that the law "might materially restrict respondent's control over its
fiscal affairs."7 The Court compared the limits of the bankruptcy
power conferred in the Constitution with limitations upon power to
tax and pointed out that the federal government was prohibited
from taxing state bonds. Commenting on Congress' application of
the bankruptcy power to municipal debt as a potentially expanding
concept, the Court cautioned:
Our special concern is with the existence of the power claimed.
• . . And it is of the first importance that due consideration be
given to the results which might be brought about by the exercise
of such power in the future.'
3. 78 CONG. REC. 7641-42 (1934) (remarks of Senator Neely).
4. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4, 36 Stat. 838.
5. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, § 80, 48 Stat. 798.
6. State moratoria laws are not obsolete. As recently as September, 1976, a New York
State law permitting suspension of payment of principal on New York City's short-term notes
was found to be constitutional by a federal district court. Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York,
415 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The same moratorium statute was found unconstitutional
under the New York Constitution by the New York Court of Appeals in a case brought by
the Flushing National Bank. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
7. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 530 (1936).
8. Id.
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The invalidation of the 1934 Act left distressed cities without
federal relief and still in deep financial trouble. These cities were
so insistent that by the next year a new statute was enacted by
Congress.' In 1938 the Supreme Court's apprehensions had appar-
ently waned, and it found the new provisions governing municipal
bankruptcies constitutional.'" The new law succeeded in meeting
the Court's tests because congressional drafters of the law were care-
ful to avoid restrictions on state control of its fiscal affairs." Juris-
diction was now limited to approving and enforcing a plan which
came to court already accepted by a majority of affected creditors.
Congress believed, or perhaps hoped, that financial problems of
local governments were temporary, for this early legislation was
considered to be emergency legislation with a 2 year life span to
expire in 1940. However, it was repeatedly extended until 1946 when
it was made a permanent chapter of the Bankruptcy Act."
After 1946, the municipal bankruptcy chapter was not
amended again until April of 1976. The statute apparently met the
needs of the debtors who resorted to it, and improving economic
conditions lessened those needs.'3 But, with recognition of New
York's recent problems, the interest in municipal bankruptcy law
revived. It became apparent that the Act, untouched for 3 decades,
was inadequate. The intensity of New York's financial crisis, and its
potential effect upon the municipal bond market, paralleled the
crisis of the 1930's in the way it focused and renewed Congressional
attention on the statute.
Examination of the Act, with New York in mind, showed it to
be unworkable for large cities needing pervasive treatment of their
financial problems. The Act appeared deficient for several reasons:
it did not provide ready access to the court; it did not provide a
mechanism for raising funds to pay ongoing expenses after filing the
petition; and it did not provide for court supervision to assure com-
pliance with a confirmed plan. The Act was workable for a local
taxing unit or a small city with a narrow range of financial prob-
lems, but the focus needed widening to meet the needs of a large
city.
9. Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653.
10. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (1970).
12. The statute providing jurisdiction was made permanent by Congress' repeal of the
jurisdiction termination clause. Act of July 1, 1946, ch. 534, § 2, 60 Stat. 409, 416, repealing
Act of June 22, 1942, ch. 434, 56 Stat. 377.
13. Sixty-four cases were filed under chapter IX in the last 30 years. Tables of Bank-
ruptcy Statistics, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.
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II. FORMER CHAPTER IX (1946-1976)
The title of the Chapter succinctly indicated its objective-to
permit "Composition of Indebtedness of Certain Taxing Agencies or
Instrumentalities." The agencies or instrumentalities included
drainage and improvement districts, school districts, counties, and
municipalities." The chapter followed the basic concept of provid-
ing a means to enforce a voluntary composition agreement with
''coercion . . . against the one-third who are not willing to come in
[with the majority on the agreement]."' 5
Under the chapter, the plan extending or composing the debt
was to be filed with the petition initiating the case. In addition, the
plan must have been accepted by 51 percent of affected creditors.
Further, the petitioner must have filed with the petition a list de-
tailing creditors by name, address, and a description of the type of
securities or claim held."
A means was provided for the debtor to obtain a stay of specific
creditor proceedings preliminary to filing the petition; however, the
stay was for a limited period no longer than 120 days. 7 To obtain
this limited stay the petitioner was obligated to demonstrate to the
court that efforts were being made in good faith to obtain the requi-
site acceptances of the plan and, further, that there was a prospect
of creditor acceptance within a reasonable period of time.
In view of the voluntary nature of the proceeding and the
required pre-petition agreements, the court basically had an after-
the-fact supervisory rather than an adjudicatory role. The Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in its 1973 report
characterized the requirement for pre-petition creditor approval of
the plan as the submission of a "fait accompli to the judge, thereby
creating substantial pressure on the judge to confirm the plan."' 8
Once the case was filed, all that was needed was an additional
15 2/3 percent affirmative vote on the plan to set the stage for con-
firmation. But obtaining that minor percentage could be a lengthy
and tedious task, particularly where a few creditors with a sub-
stantial block of claims decide to hold out." A single creditor could
block the 51 percent creditor acceptance needed for the filing of a
14. 11 U.S.C. § 401(1)-(7) (1970).
15. 77 CONG. REC. 5482 (1933) (remarks of Congressman Sumner).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 403(e) (1970).
18. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 274 (1973).
19. A single creditor caused a 2 year delay in confirmation in the case of In re York
County Natural Gas Auth., Civil No. 2075 (C.D.S.C. 1965).
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chapter IX petition and plan."0
Although the requirements of a pre-petition plan and accept-
ance seemed to provide a degree of protection for the petitioner and
its creditors and was thought necessary to support constitution-
ality,21 these requirements were now seen as procedural obstacles to
a large city. Additional problems were created by the need to file a
list of creditors. When a city's creditors include a large number of
bondholders and the bonds are held in bearer form, the holders are
unknown and widely dispersed. Even if creditors are known, compil-
ing lists of thousands of creditors places a demanding clerical bur-
den on a petitioner at the time of filing the case.
The other rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act do not
have these demanding strictures. When chapter XI was first en-
acted, it too required a plan to be filed with the petition. However,
petitioners filed pro forma plans knowing full well that the "real"
plan would be submitted later.22 The law was subsequently
amended to permit the filing of a plan after the filing of the petition.
Experience has indicated that meaningful plans often take time to
formulate and mature after the initial turbulence of case filing has
passed.
Another weakness of the former chapter IX was that it did not
provide for automatic stay of proceedings against the debtor. Entry
of a stay order was discretionary with the court. Automatic stays,
triggered by filing of a petition, are now common in cases filed under
other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act. 3 In both business and per-
sonal bankruptcies, court action is generally required to terminate
the stay, not impose it.
When New York City's financial problems became apparent,
these deficiencies and others appeared so serious in the light of
possible needs of a major city that Congress concluded
that the impracticability of existing federal bankruptcy remedies
for use by municipalities increases the likelihood of their default
and will aggrevate the adverse affects thereof .... 11
20. The city of Saluda, N.C., was prevented from filing by a single creditor for many
years. In re Saluda, Bankr. No. 1340 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
21. 81 CONG. REC. 8544 (1937) (remarks of Senator Pepper).
22. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 323, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, June 22, 1938, ch. 575,
§ 323, 52 Stat. 907.
23. Bankruptcy Rules 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401.
24. Preamble to chapter IX of Bankruptcy Act of 1976 (hereinafter "Act"), Act of April
8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315.
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III. THE CONGRESSIONAL SCENE (1975-1976)
When Congress finally recognized that the municipal bank-
ruptcy laws were impractical for present needs, it had before it the
testimony of numerous witnesses and a study by the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created to analyze
the current bankruptcy statute.25 Legislation drafted by the Com-
mission" and by a committee of Bankruptcy Judges"? proposed revi-
sions to all chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, including chapter IX.25
In addition, a number of bills dealing solely with chapter IX were
introduced because of the critical nature of New York City's finan-
cial problems."
The Ford Administration also suggested a unique approach to
New York's problems with the Bankruptcy Act. The Administration
proposed to add another chapter, chapter XVI, to the Bankruptcy
Act, designed solely for "major municipalities"-cities with a popu-
lation "in excess of 1,000,000 inhabitants."30 The Administration
bill was significant for several reasons. It was the first time the
Administration openly recognized that chapter IX was inadequate
for use by New York City. In addition, the bill marked the approach
the Administration would support in regard to new bankruptcy leg-
islation. Prior to presentment of this bill, the Administration and
many in Congress had opposed any accommodation of New York.
Chapter XVI was intended to be an alternative to chapter IX.
While it eliminated creditor approval for filing a case, it required
specific state authorization to file a petition under the chapter.2 A
city still had to present a plan with its petition. Further the peti-
tioner had to file a budget projection-"a statement of petitioner's
current and projected revenues and expenditures adequate to estab-
lish that the budget of petitioner will be in balance within a reason-
able time after adoption of the plan."33 The chapter XVI proposal
25. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
26. H.R. 31 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
27. H.R. 32 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
28. These bills are commonly known as the "Commission Bill" and the "Judges' Bill."
See Hiller, Bankruptcy, The Threshold of Change, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 253 (1977).
29. In the Senate, two bills were introduced by Mr. Buckley of New York: S. 2579 and
S. 2586. In the House, Mr. Badillo of New York introduced H.R. 9926, 9998, and 10455; and
Mr. Rodino of New Jersey and Mr. Edwards of California introduced H.R. 10454. All were in
the 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
30. S. 2597 and H.R. 10457, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
31. Statement of Antonio Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
on S. 2597 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements on Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
32. S. 2597, § 803(a), supra note 30.
33. H.R. Doc. No. 289, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
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also authorized rejection of executory contracts, but only as a pro-
vision of the plan. Thus, rejection could only come about after con-
firmation of the plan. The city was thereby deprived of flexibility
and bargaining power to negotiate modification of executory con-
tracts early in the proceeding.
Chapter XVI incorporated many proposals recommended by
earlier legislation and witnesses. It provided for issuance of certifi-
cates of indebtedness to be authorized by the court where good
cause was shown. Filing a petition automatically stayed creditor
collection efforts. Chapter XVI also contained a "cram down" provi-
sion, providing that a dissenting class of creditors "is to be paid in
cash the value of its claims or is to be afforded such method of
protection as will, consistent with the circumstances of the particu-
lar case, equitably and fairly provide for the realization of the value
of its claims."34 However, payment of "value" generally is not the
full dollar amount due. The "cram down" provision was modeled on
similar provisions in corporate and railroad reorganizations of the
Bankruptcy Act." The purpose of the "cram down" provision is to
preclude frustration of the entire plan by a class of creditors which
has voted against the plan.
The Senate accepted the philosophy of a separate chapter for
major municipalities; the House, however, opted for a revised
chapter IX applicable to public debtors of any size. Members of the
House were apparently concerned that the applicability of chapter
XVI was too limited."6 The problem of a medium or small city with
major financial problems would not be resolved by chapter XVI. In
addition, a question of the constitutionality of such a limited chap-
ter was raised in view of the requirement that bankruptcy laws be
"uniform . . . throughout the United States."37 Many other prob-
lems of the former chapter IX, such as access to the court, were not
fully resolved by the chapter XVI proposal.
The most important contribution of chapter XVI was to gener-
ate Congressional movement on municipal bankruptcy legislation,
for it was presented with emphasis on "the President's strong per-
sonal interest in this legislation as the responsible way for the Fed-
eral Government to assist New York City in overcoming its financial
difficulties. '"3s
34. H.R. Doc. No. 289, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 814(a) (1975).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7), 205(e) (1970).
36. Six cities have a population in excess of 1,000,000: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Houston, Detroit, and Philadelphia. STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (1975).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
38. Statement of Antonio Scalia, supra note 31.
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The differences in the House and Senate bills were resolved by
a Conference Committee. The Committee adopted the House ap-
proach providing for a revision of chapter IX with some of the provi-
sions from the Senate bill.39 Emerging from the Conference Commit-
tee was a new chapter IX entitled, "Adjustment of Debts of Political
Subdivisions and Public Agencies and Instrumentalities.""
IV. FEATURES OF THE NEW CHAPTER IX
The new chapter IX resolves many of the procedural difficulties
of the former chapter. Although its purpose, to aid financially dis-
tressed public instrumentalities, is the same as the prior statute, the
court now has a greater degree of involvement and greater discre-
tionary powers than before.
A unique feature in the new law is the requirement that, upon
filing of a petition in district court, the chief judge of the district is
immediately to notify the chief judge of that circuit. The chief judge
of the circuit then designates "the judge of the district court to
conduct the proceedings. . .. '" The stated purpose of this method
of assigning a judge to the case is to allow "greater flexibility in
selection of a judge, for the chief judge of a circuit may appoint a
judge that is retired, or does not sit in the district in which the
petition was filed."4 Although unexpressed, the provision for flexi-
bility in selecting the judge removes the possibility of "judge shop-
ping."
One of the fundamental changes contained in the new chapter
is the removal of the obligation to formulate a plan and obtain
creditor consent before filing the petition; however, the plan may be
filed with the petition as well as at a later time.43 Prior to enactment
of these provisions, the financial community had expressed concern
that removal of these hurdles would make use of chapter IX too
easy, thereby adversely affecting the market for public securities.
On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Commission concluded that the
pre-petition requirement "also gives those who would seek to de-
press the market price of these securities of an eligible petitioner for
improper purposes an excuse for doing so."" These same concerns
were expressed by municipal bond dealers in 1933 when the first
public debt chapter was being considered. They anticipated that its
39. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 938 to accompany H.R. 10624, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
40. Act of April 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315.
41. Section 82(d) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 402(d),(Supp. 1976).
42. H.R. REp. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
43. Section 90(a) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (Supp. 1976).
44. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 18.
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enactment would have a "suicidal effect" on the market which in-
cluded "funds for widows and orphans . . . invested in municipal
bonds."" This prophesy of doom was heeded by neither the 73rd nor
the 94th Congress.
Another feature of the new chapter is the provision for an auto-
matic stay." As in other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, the filing
of a petition now automatically stays the commencement or contin-
uation of all actions against the petitioner. Unless terminated or
modified by the court, the stay remains in effect until the property
subject to the lien or the case is disposed of. 7 Although the stay is
automatically applied at the filing of the petition and relief there-
from must be specifically requested, the party who wants the stay
to continue has the burden of showing why it should be continued."
Congress apparently wanted to be quite specific in regard to the
matter of stay. It extended the stay beyond the normal enforcement
of claims and proceedings against the petitioner to the "commence-
ment or continuation of any other act or proceeding . . ... , The
generality of this provision is intended to apply to actions against
independent entities of the petitioner although these entities are not
themselves liable for the petitioner's obligations. Accordingly, ac-
tions or proceedings against a city-owned college, a municipal light
plant, or a city airport operated as an independent corporation
would be stayed. In these instances, the stay is not automatic; it
must be requested. Apparently the stay is to be granted as long as
the proceeding to be stayed would be "detrimental to the purposes
of Chapter IX."5°
The new automatic stay provisions are quite broad. They serve
to stay not only all actions and proceedings by creditors, but also
preclude set-offs and counterclaims asserted after the filing of the
petition. For example, bank account set-offs are prohibited so that
funds on deposit will be available for the petitioner's ongoing expen-
ses. While post-petition set-offs are stayed, pre-petition set-offs
made within 4 months of filing are voidable and may be recovered
by the petitioner.5 On the matter of set-offs, Congress analogized
the public interest in railroad reorganization cases with the public
interest apparent in cases of public debtors. In railroad reorganiza-
45. 77 CONG. REC. 5731 (1933) (remarks of Senator Van Nuys).
46. Section 85(e)(1) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(e)(1) (Supp. 1976).
47. Section 85(e)(2) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(e)(2) (Supp. 1976).
48. Bankruptcy Rule 9-4(c).
49. Section 85(e)(4) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(e)(4) (Supp. 1976).
50. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42 at 23.
51. Section 85 (d) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (Supp. 1976).
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tion cases it was recognized that bank set-offs threaten rehabilita-
tion."2 Similarly, bank set-offs could impair rehabilitation of a pub-
lic debtor.A
The notice requirements of chapter IX were left relatively un-
changed. At the various Congressional hearings, witnesses pointed
out the difficulties a large city would face in meeting notice require-
ments of the former chapter IX. It would be cheaper and less oner-
ous to provide for publication as the primary method of giving no-
tice, with mail notice used to supplement publication. However,
sensitivity to constitutional due process requirements constrained
Congress to leave the notice requirements substantially as they
were. The House Committee was concerned by the expressions of
the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.54 and Eisen v. Carlisle-Jacquelin,5 which relied heavily upon
direct notice for satisfaction of due process requirements.58 Although
the Mullane and Eisen cases involved commercial entities and
might not be truly comparable to the situation of a public debtor,
Congress apparently felt that adherence to the strictures of notice
in those cases would be prudent.
Heretofore, publication notice was permitted, but the Act also
mandated mailing of notice of filing to each creditor. Now the Act
provides that "if no address is given in the list for a creditor and the
address of such creditor cannot with reasonable diligence be ascer-
tained, then a copy of the notice may, if the court so determines,
be mailed, postage prepaid, to such creditor, addressed as the court
may prescribe."57 This easing of the notice requirements aids the
petitioner with lengthy lists of creditors to whom notice need be
given.
In addition to notice to all creditors, notice must also be given
to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to the state in
which the petitioner is located.5" The SEC is to be notified so they
can protect investors in the interstate municipal bond market.59 The
52. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 453 F.2d 520, 523 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
923 (1972).
53. As the rationale for precluding set-offs, Congress cited the ruling of the Court in
Baker v. Gold Sea Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974). H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at
23.
54. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
55. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
56. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 22.
57. Section 85(d) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(d) (Supp. 1976).
58. Id. Bankruptcy Rule 9-3 requires notice to be given to the Secretary of State of the
state in which the petitioner is located.
59. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 8.
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state is to be notified because Section 84 of the Act requires the
petitioner to be generally authorized by the state to file under
chapter IX. Additionally, notification may stimulate the state to aid
the petitioner financially and, perhaps, aid in formulating and im-
plementing the plan.
State authorization for filing under chapter IX was viewed dif-
ferently by the House and Senate. The House bill stated that the
petitioner must not be prohibited from filing by state law. 0 The
Senate wanted the petitioner to be specifically authorized by the
state to file the petition." The Senate adopted the language in the
Administration proposal for chapter XVI, which required specific
authorization for filing. Thus, the court was to dismiss the petition
if state authorization was denied.62
Congress retained the provision prohibiting interference with
state powers as mandated by the tenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion and specifically noted that
[niothing contained in this Chapter [IX] shall be construed to
limit or impair the power of any State to control, by legislation
or otherwise, any municipality or any political subdivision of or
in such State in the exercise of its political or governmental pow-
ers, including expenditures therefore . . ..
This limitation on the power of the court, initially designed by
Congress in 1937 for the amended municipal bankruptcy statute,
was relied upon by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins,64
which held that statute constitutional. This provision was intended
to permit the debtor or the state to be free to manage its own fiscal
affairs. 5 Thus the court is prevented from interfering with property
or revenue of the petitioner or any income producing property owned
by the petitioner."
Although the petitioner controls its own functions, the court
now approaches the boundaries of its power to control the peti-
tioner's affairs when called upon to exercise certain of its new discre-
tionary powers. The court can authorize the issuance of certificates
of indebtedness to maintain city services.67 It can also authorize
60. Section 84, H.R. 10624, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
61. Section 803, S. 2597, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
62. Section 85(a) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(a) (Supp. 1976).
63. Section 83 Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 403 (Supp. 1976).
64. 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
65. H.R. REP. No. 517, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1937).
66. Section 82(c)(3) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 402(c)(3) (Supp. 1976); H.R. REP. No. 686, supra
note 42, at 9.
67. Section 82(b)(2) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(2) (Supp. 1976).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
rejection of executory contracts. "
Although courts have long had the power to issue certificates
of indebtedness and to authorize rejection of executory contracts
under business rehabilitation chapters of the Act, the power to do
so in chapter IX is new. The certificates are intended to permit the
debtor to raise needed money to meet expenses. However, before
any certificates can be authorized, the court must conduct a hearing
and be shown cause for their issuance. This new power fills a gap
in the old law, which had no mechanism for a municipality to raise
money to pay for essential city services. Certainly, public services
necessary to maintain health and safety must be paid for during the
pendency of a case. However, the Act does not specify the types of
city services to be maintained. The needs of particular cities will
undoubtedly vary. For example, garbage collection is an obvious
necessity in a large city but may be relatively unimportant in a
small town. A methadone clinic may be required for the health and
safety of a particular community and yet not be essential elsewhere.
Clearly, the court could find "cause" whenever the petitioner shows
that the proposed expense is for a function necessary for the health
or safety of its inhabitants.
The authorized certificates are to be privately placed. To en-
hance the marketability of the certificates, the court can authorize
their issuance with security and priority in payment over existing
obligations.69 Priority in payment may even be ordered over existing
secured debt. This grant of priority over secured debt was chal-
lenged as a violation of due process when such certificates were
issued in railroad reorganization cases. Congress apparently felt
that the rationale for satisfaction of due process as expressed by the
Supreme Court in the regional rail reorganization cases applies in
chapter IX should the court override the rights of bondholders. 0 In
the railroad cases, the Court explained that by borrowing to meet
current expenses, the petitioner was preserving the collateral of
prior secured creditors by preserving the business of the debtor as
an ongoing entity; and thereby there was no real taking of property
when new security was given ahead of preexisting liens.
The power to authorize rejection of executory contracts, as in
the instance of certificates of indebtedness, has been vested in the
68. Section 82(b)(1) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(1) (Supp. 1976).
69. Section 82(b)(2) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(2) (Supp. 1976).
70. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 9, citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (declaring first Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional); Wright v.
Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (upholding second Frazier-
Lemke Act); Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
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courts by other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act.7" However, this
power was not available to public debtors until the enactment of the
new chapter IX.72 Although an executory contract can be rejected,
the creditor whose contract is rejected has a claim for damages
resulting from the breach.
The legislative history of the new statute indicates that Con-
gress intended that the case law interpreting the executory contract
provisions in chapters X and XI apply to chapter IX.73 Generally,
the tests for rejection of contracts in other bankruptcy chapters are
that the contract is a detriment to the debtor and that rejection will
aid the debtor's reorganization.74 The primary concern is for the
interests of the debtor, not the rejectee.
Among the contracts which can be rejected by a court in
chapter IX are labor contracts. With respect to labor contracts, the
courts have expressed concern for the interest of the employees as
well as the debtor. The court must weigh these interests before
permitting rejection.75 In the event that labor contracts are rejected,
new contracts would ordinarily have to be negotiated. If renegotia-
tion is required, the bankruptcy court will have to consider not only
federal law but also applicable state laws governing labor contracts.
Applicable law may require a process or procedure for the renegotia-
tion and formulation of a new collective bargaining agreement for
public employees. A rejection might also be considered sufficiently
similar to a termination of the contract that applicable law might
require maintenance of terms and conditions of employment exist-
ing under the terminated or rejected contract during the interim
between rejection and conclusion of the bargaining process. Section
83 of the Act" would prohibit a chapter IX proceeding from interfer-
ing with or derogating from any state law that regulates the way in
which cities execute these governmental functions."
The right to reject a contract may also include the right to
reject contractual obligations under pension agreements. The re-
cently enacted Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
does not protect government workers against such a rejection be-
cause the Act only applies to private pension plans.7" However, a
71. 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(1) and 713(1) (1970).
72. Sections 82(b) and 88(c) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 402(b) and 408(c) (Supp. 1976).
73. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 17.
74. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed.) 3.23[41, at 571; 8 COLLIER 3.15[8], at 206.
75. Shopmen's Local 445 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
76. 11 U.S.C.A. § 403 (Supp. 1976).
77. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 8-9.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (Supp. V, 1975).
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state may have pension legislation to protect against such rejec-
tions, and those provisions must be respected.
Rejection of an executory contract can be requested at any time
after the petition is filed. This permits rejection of onerous contracts
early in the proceeding. Request for rejection may result in a modifi-
cation of terms of the contract prior to the hearing on rejection.
Whenever possible, courts will undoubtedly allow time for renego-
tiation before the hearing on rejection. However, the benefits of
rejection may prove illusory, because the cost of terminating a con-
tract may exceed the cost of continuing it. In the instance of em-
ployment contracts, severance pay requirements may outweigh the
practical benefits of rejection.
Another change introduced by the new Act is in the number of
creditor acceptances needed to approve the plan. The former
chapter IX required an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the aggre-
gate amount of claims of all classes of creditors affected by the
plan.79 The new Act sets the requisite majority for acceptance at
two-thirds in amount of claims of each class and "more than 50%
in number" of claims of each class." The purpose of the dual voting
requirements is to balance the voting powers of a few large creditors
against the collective position of a large number of smaller creditors.
Neither should dominate the proceeding.
The two-thirds vote is determined on the basis of the total
amount of claims for which a written acceptance or rejection has
been filed.'" This is a change from former law which required accept-
ances by creditors holding two-thirds of the aggregate amount of all
claims whether or not acceptances or rejections were filed. The vote
is now computed by totaling the acceptances and rejections of those
eligible to vote who actually do vote."2 An acceptance or rejection
may only be filed by claimants affected by the plan. The filing of a
claim in and of itself does not compromise acceptance or rejection
of the plan. In fact, the filing of a claim is not required for allowance
of a claim if the claim is properly listed on the petitioner's sched-
ules.13
Creditors vote by classes designated by the court. A class is
comprised of creditors holding claims of "substantially similar char-
79. Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 83(d), 50 Stat. 653.
80. Section 92(b) Act, ii U.S.C.A. § 412(b) (Supp. 1976).
81. In order to determine the percentage of bondholders for acceptance of a plan, the face
amount of the bonds is used. Equitable Reserve Ass'n v. Dardanelle Special School Dist., 138
F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1943).
82. Section 92(e) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 412(c) (Supp. 1976); Bankruptcy Rule 9-25(c).
83. Section 88(a) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (Supp. 1976). See also Bankruptcy Rule
9-22(b)(2) and (b)(3) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.
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acter," the members of which enjoy "substantially similar rights."84
The former law prescribed the class to be made up of claimants
holding claims payable out of the same source." Although the for-
mer classification scheme worked for limited debt structures, it ap-
peared as another unworkable feature considering the needs of large
cities. The variety of debt paper and the various strata of suppliers,
contractors and employees of the debtor led logically to liberalizing
the former classificationg.
The creditors vote on the plan by class. The requisite majority,
two-thirds of amount and more than 50 percent in number, is to be
sought within each class for acceptance of the plan. However, a plan
can still be confirmed by the court even where there is a reluctant
class of creditors which has voted to reject the plan. If a class is not
affected by the plan or if a class is to be paid in cash in full, then
the class' acceptance is not necessary. Also, if the plan provides "for
the protection of the interest, claims or lien of such creditor or class
of creditors," again the plan may be considered accepted by that
class even though the class votes nay."9 This section, including the
"cram down" provision, was taken from the former act. 7 The consti-
tutionality of this provision was upheld in Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford"8 and Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases."9 Accordingly, the nonconsenting creditor class is considered
"not affected" since the court can substitute fair value for the credi-
tors' claims. A "fair" valuation of a claim for this purpose is not
necessarily the face amount of the claim. Valuation requires among
other things a considered estimate of the future revenues of the
petitioner."
Under former chapter IX, once the court approved the petition
as properly filed, the proceeding could be dismissed when the case
had not been prosecuted with "reasonable diligence," where it was
unlikely that the plan will be accepted by the requisite number of
creditors, or where confirmation was denied." These provisions have
been incorporated and expanded to permit both permissive and
mandatory dismissal.2 The case may be dismissed in the court's
discretion after hearing on notice for want of prosecution, for failure
84. Section 88(b) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 408(b) (Supp. 1976).
85. Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 83(b), 50 Stat. 653.
86. Section 92(d) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 412(d) (Supp. 1976).
87. Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 83(d), 50 Stat. 653.
88. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
89. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
90. S. REP. No. 458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975).
91. Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 83(b) and (e), 50 Stat. 653.
92. Section 98 Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 418 (Supp. 1976); Bankruptcy Rule 9-28.
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to file a plan on time, or for creditor failure to accept a proposed
plan. In addition, the court may dismiss where it has retained juris-
diction after confirmation of a plan and the petitioner defaults in
performance. The court is obligated to dismiss the case if confirma-
tion is refused. 3 However, the court is not limited to these grounds
for a dismissal in view of its inherent powers. 4
Although a plan may be accepted by the appropriate vote of
creditors, it must pass certain statutory tests before it can be con-
firmed by the court. Notably, the court must be satisfied that the
plan is "fair and equitable and feasible and does not discriminate
unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors."9 Other consid-
erations include disclosure of paymentg for serviceg and expengeg,
good faith of the petitioner, and compliance with the requirements
of the chapter. The court's findings and conclusions on these fac-
tors for confirmation are to be made independent of the fact that
creditors have voted to accept the plan and were thereby impliedly
satisfied with its provisions. 7
The principal requirement that the plan be fair and equitable
incorporates the absolute priority rule. That rule requires that sen-
ior creditors are entitled to the benefit of the value of their claims
before the claims of junior creditors. The court determines these
priorities among creditors on the basis of state law. 9
The new chapter IX requires that the plan also be "feasible."
Although the term "feasible" is newly included in the chapter, feasi-
bility has always been a factor to consider prior to confirmation.'10
Feasibility means simply that there is reasonable prospect that the
petitioner will be able to meet obligations imposed by the plan. If
the plan is based on receipt of tax revenues, the past and projected
revenues and expenses are to be considered. In this regard, the
petitioner is to exercise its taxing powers to the fullest extent legally
permissible for the benefit of creditors.'1'
A unique feature of this Act is the granting of power to the court
to consider the interests of the petitioner's employees during the
confirmation process. Labor unions and employees' associations
may be heard by the court "on the economic soundness of the plan
93. Section 98(b) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 418(b) (Supp. 1976).
94. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 36.
95. Section 94(b) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 414(b) (Supp. 1976).
96. Id.
97. American United Mut. Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
98. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
99. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 32.
100. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943).
101. Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940).
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affecting the interests of the represented employees" of the peti-
tioner.' 2 However, the union or association may not contest the vote
on a plan nor appeal matters concerning the plan.03
The Senate proposal for a new chapter XVI would have added
an additional condition for confirmation to those finally enacted.
The Senate would have required that the petitioner's projected
budget be balanced within a reasonable time after adoption of the
plan.' 4 The Senate gave this condition considerable emphasis, be-
cause failure to show a balanced budget mandated dismissal of the
case. Although a minority of the House Judiciary Subcommittee
was also strongly in favor of the balanced budget requirement, the
Conference Committee rejected the proposal. Even though the Act
does not require a balanced budget, the petitioner's future ability
to balance its budget should be considered by the court when weigh-
ing factors for confirmation."'5
After confirmation, the court has been newly empowered to
retain jurisdiction over the case. It retains jurisdiction for the period
the court determines necessary for the successful execution of the
plan. ' 6 The term of retention may be years-as long as the longest
security issued under the plan. 07 The purpose of retention of juris-
diction is to enforce compliance with terms of the plan. This new
provision was obviously introduced to insure continuity in comply-
ing with terms of the plan although political administrations of the
petitioner may change. 00
Both the former chapter IX and the present chapter provide for
severability in the event any portion of the chapter is deemed in-
valid. 10 Severability is a common rule of statutory construction."0
However, the application of the rule in the new chapter may have
rather curious results, because the statute also provides in section
3:
If the amendment made by this Act is judicially finally deter-
mined to be unconstitutional then Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy
102. Section 94(a) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 414(a) (Supp. 1976).
103. S. REP. No. 458, supra note 90, at 18.
104. Section 817(c)(7) of S. 2597, supra note 30.
105. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 938, supra note 39, at 21.
106. Section 96(e) Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 416(e) (Supp. 1976).
107. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 35.
108. Ranger, Texas (Civil No. 204, N.D. Tex.) is notable for its filing of a number of
successive plans. Succeeding administrations failed to meet the requirements of the plans
agreed to by their predecessors.
109. Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 2 (April 8, 1976), Act of July 1, 1946, ch. 532, § 81, 60 Stat.
409.
110. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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Act, as such Chapter existed on the day before the date of enact-
ment of this Act, is revived and shall have full force and effect
with respect to cases filed after such determination.
Clearly, section 3 is a form of statutory hedging.
The new substantive matters within the chapter, such as au-
thorization of certificates of indebtedness and rejection of executory
contracts, apparently rested uneasily with some members of Con-
gress. "'1 These innovations are untested as they apply to municipali-
ties. Undoubtedly, they will draw constitutional challenges. The
underlying reason for section 3 apparently is the fear that the new
chapter IX may be found wholly unconstitutional, and municipali-
ties will be left without any remedy in bankruptcy court.
How section 2, the severability section, will interact with the
reversion section, section 3, is unclear. It is difficult to anticipate
how the invalidation of "the amendment made by this Act," which
is applicable to one or more sections of the new chapter, will affect
the validity of the entire chapter, thereby causing reversion to prior
law. Should the provision for certificates of indebtedness be found
to be invalid, will the court merely resort to severability? If both the
executory contracts and certificate sections are found unconstitu-
tional, will the weight of these provisions result in reversion to the
former chapter? Clearly, the chapter can stand without these sec-
tions even though they incorporate major changes. What is un-
known is the combination of substantive and procedural changes
that might cause reversion. The interaction of these two sections
may itself result in litigation because the scope of section 3 is not
clearly defined.
V. CONCLUSION
The new chapter IX has met many of the problems perceived
in the former Act. Public debtors now have better access to the
court. Means exist to raise funds for the maintenance of the debtor
during chapter IX proceedings. Procedures for filing have been sub-
stantially eased. The power to reject executory contracts and the
various discretionary powers of the court should aid the formulation
of viable plans and their progress to confirmation.
Although cities may now issue priority certificates of indebted-
ness to raise operating cash for essential services, there is no assur-
ance that there will be a market for these certificates. There may
be need for some form of guarantee of certificate repayment to en-
111. H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 42, at 60-62.
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courage marketability at reasonable interest rates. Such a guaran-
tee provision seems an inappropriate subject for a bankruptcy law;
however, it may be accomplished by separate statute."2 There is
precedent for similar guarantee legislation in the Penn Central and
Lockheed situations.
The Act also lacks a method for involving state or regional
authorities in the formulation of a city's plan. In some instances, it
may be necessary for these authorities to assume responsibility for
some of the city's functions. For example, the city may have reached
the point where it can no longer carry a transit system or municipal
hospitals, or maintain airport facilities. These functions cannot be
unilaterally discontinued or terminated; however, they can be
maintained by larger taxing units, such as the state, county, or
regional authorities. Where it appears that the petitioner cannot
alone design a workable plan, the court should have the power to
bring necessary parties together to produce such a plan.
The court's power to dismiss a case before successful comple-
tion of a plan seems wholly misconceived and entirely inappropriate
in the case of a public debtor. While dismissal in private litigation
may be an effective punitive power of the court, dismissal of an
insolvent city without a confirmed plan leaves the citizenry without
relief. It would seem that the dismissal of a case before its successful
conclusion should be affirmatively precluded in view of the nature
of such a proceeding. The court has sufficient traditional powers to
enforce movement of a case, and any failure of plan acceptance or
confirmation should only lead to further efforts to find an accep-
table solution. Mandatory dismissal, if confirmation is refused,
certainly does not meet the needs of the parties. The dismissal
provisions, both permissive and mandatory, give undue power to
creditors and the court.
In spite of these imperfections, chapter IX should serve well for
cities overburdened with debt they can no longer carry. The chapter
provides the only statutory process for a city to divest itself of obli-
gations it has incurred which its tax base can no longer support.
The traditional tensions between federal powers and states'
rights will inevitably bring constitutional challenges to the various
new aspects of the chapter. Challenges to expansion of bankruptcy
legislation are not new. Justice Cardozo's dissenting opinion in
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, "' char-
112. In the early years of chapter IX, the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation
often granted loans to finance chapter IX plans. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319
U.S. 415 (1943).
113. 298 U.S. 513, 535 (1936).
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acterized the history of bankruptcy law as an "expanding concept
that has had to fight its way." Undoubtedly, this new legislation will
also take its historic turn in fighting its way to meet the challenge
of the cities in these times.
